Judgment Analysis – Danial Latifi Vs Union Of India - Shonee Kapoor

Danial Latifi Vs Union Of India

Judgement Analysis

FACTS

The case follows its pursuit from the famous case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum, commonly referred as the Shah Bano case.  Shah Bano, a 62-year-old Muslim mother of five from Indore, Madhya Pradesh, was divorced by her husband in 1978. She filed a criminal suit under Section 125 of the CrPC, ultimately in the Supreme Court of India, she won the right to alimony from her husband. However, she was subsequently denied the alimony when the Indian Parliament reversed the judgment by passing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 which diluted the judgment of the Supreme Court and, in reality, denied even utterly destitute Muslim divorcees the right to alimony from their former husbands. The 1986 Act provided that under section 3(1)(a), a divorced woman is entitled to reasonable and fair provisions, and maintenance within the ‘iddat’ period, thereby denying the subsequent and further maintenance to such wives from their divorced husbands. Muslim woman were left to be maintained on the hands of their relatives after the iddat period. Therefore, the constitutional validity of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 was challenged before the Supreme Court in this case through filing a writ petition claiming that it was unconstitutional, and in violation of Article 14  as it deprived Muslim women of maintenance benefits equivalent to those provided to other women under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code and that the law would leave Muslim women destitute and thus was violative of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

OBSERVATION

1. According to S. 3(1)(a) r/w S. 3(3) of the 1986 Act the Muslim divorced women’s right to provision and maintenance has been subjected to the condition of husband having sufficient means whereas the Muslim personal law makes it unconditional obligation of the husband to provide maintenance to the wife till the iddat period expires. Therefore it appears contrary to Muslim Law as well as Shah Bano case.
2. Distinction between ‘provision’ and ‘maintenance’ has to be done. Provision would mean that the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs of his wife and he has to make the preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs. Reasonable and fair provision includes the provision for her residence clothes, food etc.
3. The word ‘within’ used in S. 3(1)(a) of  Act should be read as “on or before, not beyond” and therefore this provision would mean that on or before the expiration of iddat period the husband is bound to make provision and pay the maintenance to the wife and such responsibility of the husband is would extend to whole life of woman unless she remarries.

HELD

While upholding the validity of the Act court held that:

1. A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the Act.
2. Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period.
3. A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.
4. The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court applied a construction requiring it to choose the interpretation of the law that would save it from being struck down as unconstitutional. As a result, the court upheld the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 Act by interpreting it to provide Muslim women with the same maintenance that women of other religions are entitled to under Section 125. The Court examined S.3(1)(a), which stated that a divorced woman is entitled to “a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband.” The Court interpreted this as two separate obligations: (1) to make reasonable and fair provision and (2) to pay maintenance. The Court then found “reasonable and fair provision” to mean a provision in advance for the future needs of the ex-wife, including her residence, food, clothes, and other necessities. Ultimately, the Court found that the 1986 Act requires a Muslim husband to provide maintenance of a reasonable and fair amount needed to maintain his ex-wife for the rest of her life, but that he must pay this amount in total during the iddat period. By construing the Act in this manner, the Supreme Court avoided holding it unconstitutional.

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