Anjana Rashmi Minz vs The State Of Jharkhand
Court: HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND
Bench: JUSTICE R.R.Prasad, J
Anjana Rashmi Minz vs The State Of Jharkhand on 11 December 2014
Law Point: Consent given under a promise of marriage, based on love, is not a misconception of fact, and is voluntary.
JUDGEMENT
Heard  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  and  the learned  counsel  for  the  State  on  this interlocutory  application,  wherein prayer has been made to allow the appellant to implead the person, who has been acquitted under the impugned judgment, as party respondent in this appeal.
The person, to whom the appellant intends to implead as party, appears  to  be  necessary  party.  Accordingly,  the  prayer  made  in  this interlocutory application is hereby  allowed. Let Shera Samson Tirkey be impleaded as party respondent no. 2 in this appeal.
I.A. No. 5352 of 2014, stands disposed of.
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 961 of 2013
This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  dated  21st September, 2013, passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner IIIÂÂcumÂÂFTC  (CAW),  Ranchi  in  Sessions  Trial  No.  449 of  2012  (T.R.  No. 131/2013),  whereby  the  accused  person,  who  was  put  on  trial  for  the offence punishable under Sections 376 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, was acquitted.
It is the case of the prosecution that the accused/newly added respondent no. 2, on the pretext of marrying the victim went on having sex with her, but he subsequently, refused to marry her.
On such accusation, the accused was put on trial, during which witnesses  were  examined  including  the  prosecutrix  (PWÂÂ1),  who  in  her testimony did testify that the accused promised to marry her and under that  promise  she  went  on  having  sex  with  him.  But,  subsequently,  he refused to marry. The prosecutrix is a major and under the circumstances, whatever act the accusedÂÂrespondent no. 2, is said to have done that was done with the consent of the prosecutrix and in that situation the Court acquitted the accused of the charges framed under Sections 376 & 420 of the Indian Penal Code. That is under challenge.
According  to  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant,  the victim PW 1 though had given consent to the accusedÂÂrespondent no. 2 to have have  sex  with  her,  but  that  consent  was  given  when  promise  had been made by the accused to marry her and, therefore, it can be said that the consent was given under misconception of the fact and if it is so then it can never be said that the accused had had sex with the consent of the appellant. Learned counsel in support of his submissions has referred to a decisions  rendered  in  a  case  of  “State  of  U.P.  ÂÂversus  Naushad,  AIR  2014 SC 384”.
Thus, it was submitted that the trial court committed illegality in acquitting the accusedÂÂrespondent no. 2.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case referred to above, was pleased to hold that the consent obtained under a misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, cannot be said to be voluntary consent. But that was held under the facts and circumstances of the case where the accused having promised the prosecutrix to marry her,  went  on  having  sex  with  her  and  then  refused  to marry  when  the prosecutrix did carry pregnancy.
Here  in  the  instant  case  the  fact  appears  to  be  some  what different as it is evident from the judgment that the prosecutrix was in love with the accused and in that situation, when the prosecutrix had fallen in love with the accused and if the accused makes a promise to marry her and  under  that  promise  if  the  accused  was  having  sex  with  the prosecutrix, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix gave consent under a misconception of fact. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a  case  of “Uday  versus  State of Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 46]”, wherein their Lordships after placing reliance on the decision of “Jayanti  Rani  Panda  versus  State  of  W.B.  (1984  Cr.L.J.  1534)”  observed  as follows:
“It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinioin is in  favour  of  the  view  that  the  consent  given  by  the  prosecutrix  to  sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love  on a  promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be  said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is  not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree  with  this  view,  but  we  must  add  that  there  is  no  straitjacket  formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix  to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a  misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down  by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while  considering a question of consent, bu the court must, in each case,  consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances,  before  reaching  a  conclusion,  because  each  case  has  its  own  peculiar acts which may have a bearing on the question whether  the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of  fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that  the  burden  is  on  the  prosecution  to  prove  each  and  every  ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.”
Apparently  it  does  appear  from  the  observation  made  by  the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the consent given by the prosecutrix on the promise  made  by  the accused  to have sexual intercourse with a person with  whom  she  is  deeply  in  love,  cannot  be  said  to  be  given  under  a misconception of fact.
Under the circumstances, we do not find any illegality with the judgment  and  order  under  challenge. Accordingly,  this  appeal  stands dismissed.
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