The Delhi High Court has acquitted a man convicted under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act, ruling that merely saying “physical relations” isn’t enough to prove rape without specific evidence or description.
NEW DELHI: In a crucial judgment that may shape future sexual offence trials, the Delhi High Court has held that the mere use of the phrase “physical relations” is not enough to prove rape or penetrative sexual assault under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) or Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act.
The Court, led by Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, acquitted a man who had been sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment by a trial court. The case, titled Rahul @ Bhupinder Verma vs State (NCT of Delhi), stemmed from an FIR filed at Alipur Police Station, Delhi (FIR No. 255/2016).
The judgment, reserved on July 24, 2025, and pronounced on October 17, 2025, addressed whether simply stating that “physical relations” occurred automatically meant that rape had taken place.
Justice Ohri observed:
“Whether use of the expression ‘physical relations’ would automatically mean rape or penetrative sexual assault, or whether there has to be some further description or other evidence to establish the connection between the term ‘physical relations’ and the offence?”
Case Background
The complainant, a 16-year-old minor, alleged that her cousin Rahul used to visit her house often. Their friendship turned into a relationship, and he promised to marry her. She said that on this promise, he “established physical relations” with her for about one and a half years before refusing to marry her.
Heartbroken, she consumed poison on November 12, 2014, and was hospitalised for almost two months. The FIR was registered in March 2016, almost one and a half years later, after she regained her ability to speak.
The trial court convicted Rahul under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing him to 10 years in jail and a ₹500 fine.
Arguments in the Appeal
Rahul’s counsel — Mr. Vinayak Bhandari, assisted by Ms. Teestu Mishra and Ms. Jaisal Singh — argued that the delay in filing the FIR and lack of clarity in the testimony made the conviction unsustainable.
They said:
“At no point does the victim specify what was meant by the phrase ‘physical relations.’”
They also pointed out that there was no medical or forensic proof, and that no penetrative sexual act was ever described by the complainant.
The prosecution, led by Mr. Pradeep Gahalot, APP for State, and Ms. Tanya Agarwal, counsel for the victim, maintained that the girl was a minor and that the accused had committed rape on the false promise of marriage.
Court’s Findings
Justice Ohri said the Court’s duty is to ensure that a child witness’s statement contains all essential facts.
“If it appears that the testimony of the child witness is lacking in essential details, it is the statutory duty of the court to ask certain questions to obtain proper proof of the relevant facts,” the Court noted.
He further stated that no effort was made to clarify what the complainant meant by “physical relations”:
“The testimony of the child victim or her parents would show that it has been repeatedly stated that ‘physical relations’ were established; however, there is no clarity as to what was meant by the expression ‘physical relations’. No further description of the alleged act has been given.”
The Court also noted that the medical examination was delayed by over one and a half years, and no internal examination or forensic evidence was available.
“There is no forensic material on record,” Justice Ohri said.
Definition and Legal Context
The Court explained that the term “physical relations” is not defined under either the IPC or the POCSO Act.
It quoted the definition of penetrative sexual assault under Section 3 of the POCSO Act and Section 375 of the IPC, both of which require proof of penetration.
Citing Virender vs State (2009), Justice Ohri noted:
“Commission of an offence under section 376 certainly requires some evidence with regard to the acts which were committed by an accused person to establish the ingredients of the offence.”
He observed that vague terms like “galat kaam” or “gandi harkatein” in testimonies cannot by themselves prove sexual assault, since these could refer to anything ranging from minor touching to intimacy.
The Court relied on a Division Bench ruling in Sahjan Ali v. State (2024 SCC OnLine Del 9079), which clarified that:
“The phrase ‘physical relations’ cannot be converted automatically into sexual intercourse let alone sexual assault.”
Similarly, the Sikkim High Court in Dipesh Tamang v. State of Sikkim (2020 SCC OnLine Sikk 24) had ruled:
“‘Physical relationship’, by way of surmises and conjectures, cannot be construed to mean penetrative sexual assault within the meaning of Section 3 of the POCSO Act.”
Judicial Duty in Child Testimonies
Justice Ohri also emphasized that courts must play an active role in clarifying vague testimony, particularly when dealing with child witnesses. Referring to Section 165 of the Evidence Act, he said judges are empowered to ask questions to “obtain proper proof of relevant facts.”
He added that courts should ensure vulnerable witnesses feel safe and are not confused by complicated questioning.
“The court should allow the questions to be put in simple language avoiding slang, jargon, or metaphors… Where the witness seems confused, instead of repetition of the same question, the court should direct its rephrasing”
-He observed while referencing Delhi High Court’s 2024 Guidelines for Recording Evidence of Vulnerable Witnesses.
Final Judgment
Finding major inconsistencies, lack of medical proof, and an unexplained delay in filing the FIR, the Court said:
“Indeed, this is an unfortunate case. However, the court is bound to decide the case on its own merits and the evidence that has surfaced on record as well as the precedent of the Division Bench of this Court.”
He concluded:
“In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the use of the term ‘physical relations’, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, would not be sufficient to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt.”
Thus, the High Court set aside the trial court’s conviction, stating it was “unsustainable.”
“Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside,” Justice Ohri ordered.
The Court directed that the accused be released immediately if not required in any other case.
Explanatory Table — Laws & Sections Mentioned
| Law / Provision | Description (Simplified) | Application in This Case |
| Section 376 IPC | Punishment for the offence of rape. Requires proof of penetration, even partial, against the woman’s will or under prohibited circumstances. | The trial court convicted Rahul under this section, but the High Court held there was no proof of penetrative sexual act, hence acquittal. |
| Section 6 POCSO Act, 2012 | Punishment for Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault — applies when the assault occurs repeatedly or under special circumstances involving a child (below 18 years). | The High Court ruled that the term “physical relations” was too vague and did not prove penetrative sexual assault, so Section 6 could not apply. |
| Section 3 POCSO Act | Defines Penetrative Sexual Assault — inserting the penis or any object/body part into the vagina, anus, urethra, or causing the child to do so. | The Court noted that no description or evidence of such act was provided; hence this foundational fact was not proved. |
| Section 5 (l) POCSO Act | Defines Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault — when done repeatedly with a child. | Not proved — as the statement only used “physical relations” without clarifying nature or repetition. |
| Section 29 POCSO Act | Presumption of guilt — the Court shall presume the accused committed the offence unless proven otherwise, but only after foundational facts are established. | Court held foundational facts missing, so presumption under Section 29 did not apply. |
| Section 164 CrPC | Statement of the victim recorded before a magistrate. | The victim stated: “Rahul mere saath ek-dedh saal se shareerik sambandh bana raha tha…”, but the Court found this statement vague and lacking legal detail. |
| Section 313 CrPC | Accused’s examination to explain incriminating evidence. | Rahul denied all allegations and claimed false implication due to a financial dispute. |
| Section 165 Indian Evidence Act | Gives power to judges to ask any question to discover the truth. | Court observed that the trial judge should have clarified what “physical relations” meant. |
| Section 428 CrPC | Allows set-off for pre-trial detention against sentence. | Granted earlier at trial stage; became redundant after acquittal. |
| Section 375 IPC | Defines “rape” in legal terms, detailing acts and conditions amounting to rape. | High Court compared it with the victim’s vague term “physical relations” and concluded rape not established. |
| Delhi High Court Vulnerable Witness Guidelines, 2024 (Rule 23) | Provides rules for questioning minors in sensitive cases — must be simple, non-intimidating, and court-controlled. | Court said no such safeguards or clarifications were followed while recording testimony. |
| Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra (2022 INSC 39) | Supreme Court ruling on protection of vulnerable witnesses. | Cited to emphasize child witness handling standards. |
| Sahjan Ali v. State (2024 SCC OnLine Del 9079) | Delhi HC precedent: “Physical relations” or “sambandh” alone don’t prove rape. | Relied upon as binding precedent to acquit the accused. |
| Dipesh Tamang v. State of Sikkim (2020 SCC OnLine Sikk 24) | Held that “physical relationship” cannot be equated to “penetrative sexual assault.” | Cited to reinforce that vague expressions cannot establish guilt. |
| Virender v. State (2009 SCC OnLine Del 3083) | Delhi HC held that vague words like “galat kaam” don’t suffice to prove rape. | Referred to highlight need for explicit evidence in sexual offence trials. |
Case Summary
| Field | Details |
| Case Title | Rahul @ Bhupinder Verma vs State (NCT of Delhi) |
| Case Number | Criminal Appeal No. 808 of 2023 |
| Court | High Court of Delhi at New Delhi |
| Coram (Bench) | Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri |
| Date Reserved | July 24, 2025 |
| Date Pronounced | October 17, 2025 |
| FIR No. | 255/2016 |
| Police Station | Alipur, Delhi |
| Sections Invoked | Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 |
| Appellant (Accused) | Rahul @ Bhupinder Verma |
| Respondent | State (NCT of Delhi) |
| Advocates for Appellant | Mr. Vinayak Bhandari, Ms. Teestu Mishra, and Ms. Jaisal Singh |
| Advocates for Respondent (State) | Mr. Pradeep Gahalot, APP for State |
| Advocate for Victim | Ms. Tanya Agarwal |
| Trial Court Sentence (Before Appeal) | 10 Years Rigorous Imprisonment + ₹500 fine (in default, 7 days Simple Imprisonment) |
| Judgment Outcome | Conviction set aside, Appellant acquitted and released forthwith |
Key Takeaways for Readers
- Delay ≠ Proof Lost: FIR was lodged 1.5 years after the alleged act; no medical or forensic corroboration.
- Vague Phrases ≠ Crime Proven: “Physical relations” without describing penetration cannot prove rape under IPC or POCSO.
- Judicial Duty to Clarify: Court cited Section 165 Evidence Act—Judges must seek clarity if a child witness gives ambiguous testimony.
- Presumption under POCSO Limited: Section 29 applies only after basic facts are proved.
- Verdict: Conviction “unsustainable”; man acquitted after serving nearly a decade in custody.
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