ANDHRA PRADESH:<\/em>The Andhra Pradesh High Court<\/a><\/strong> has quashed a cruelty and dowry case<\/strong> against a woman accused of being the second wife of an already married man. The Court held that she could not be treated as a “relative” of the husband for prosecution under Section 498A IPC<\/strong>.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code <\/em><\/strong>punishes cruelty committed against a married woman by her husband or his relatives. The FIR <\/a>also included allegations under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition<\/em><\/strong> Act, 1961<\/em><\/strong>, <\/em>which prohibit giving, taking and demanding dowry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Justice K. Sreenivasa Reddy <\/strong>relied on the Supreme Court judgment in U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police (2009)<\/em><\/strong>while examining the legal meaning of the term \u201crelative\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Court observed:<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Apparently, a perusal of the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner\/A6, who is alleged to have bigamy of accused No.1, would not come under the meaning of relative…A perusal of the contents of the charge sheet coupled with the statements of listed witnesses prima facie goes to show that the accused No.1 had not deserted the respondent No.2\/ de facto complainant and it appears that though they are having marital disputes, they have been residing together under one roof, since there is no statement that any of the party filed petition seeking decree for dissolution of their marriage.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n When such is the case, it is quite surprising to state by the respondent No.2\/de facto complainant in her statement that she learnt about the second marriage of accused No.1 with the petitioner\/A6. If really the accused No.1 had illicit intimacy with the petitioner\/A6 and contacted second marriage with her, she might have filed some proof to that effect. Further, if at all the accused No.1 contacted second marriage with the petitioner\/A6, she would be the aggrieved person under Section 494 of IPC arising out of the gross fraud perpetrated upon her, concealing the fact of accused No.1 having an earlier living wife i.e. respondent No.2\/de facto complainant and marrying the petitioner\/ A6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The case was filed by a woman who had been named as accused No. 6. She was accused of marrying the complainant\u2019s husband while his first marriage was still legally continuing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n She approached the High Court seeking the quashing of proceedings against her under Section 498A IPC<\/em><\/strong> and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the prosecution, the complainant married accused No. 1 in 2003, and the couple had two daughters. She alleged that her husband and his family harassed her for not giving birth to a male child and demanded additional dowry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The complainant further alleged that her husband developed an illicit relationship with the petitioner and married her without the complainant\u2019s consent. She also claimed that the petitioner encouraged the husband and his family to subject her to mental and physical cruelty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The petitioner denied the allegations and argued that she had been falsely added to the criminal case because of the matrimonial dispute between the complainant and her husband.<\/p>\n\n\n\n She submitted that she was neither the complainant\u2019s husband nor his legally recognised \u201crelative\u201d. Therefore, she could not be prosecuted under Section 498A IPC merely on the basis of an allegation that she was involved with the husband.<\/p>\n\n\n\n She also relied upon previous judgments of the Supreme Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court to support her request for quashing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The complainant opposed the petition. She argued that the petitioner had entered into a second marriage with accused No. 1 and had encouraged the alleged dowry demands. She claimed that these issues required evidence and should be decided during a full trial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After examining the charge sheet and witness statements, the High Court found that the complainant and her husband continued to live under the same roof despite their matrimonial disputes. The Court also noted that neither party had initiated divorce proceedings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Court found no supporting proof of the alleged second marriage. It observed that if the petitioner had actually married accused No. 1 without knowing that he already had a living wife, she could herself be treated as a person deceived by him under Section 494 IPC<\/strong>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding the allegations under Section 498A IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Court found only “vague and bald allegations” against the petitioner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Court noted that no specific material had been placed on record to show how the petitioner was connected with the alleged cruelty or dowry demands. Criminal prosecution, particularly in a matrimonial dispute, cannot continue merely because a person has been named without clear and specific allegations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Court further held that even if all accusations against the petitioner were accepted, “no prima facie case for the offences alleged is made out against her”.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n It also observed that the possibility of her conviction after trial was extremely weak and remote. Continuing the case in such circumstances would unnecessarily subject an accused person to a prolonged criminal trial without sufficient supporting material.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accordingly, the High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner, who had been arrayed as accused No. 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
EXPLANATORY TABLE OF LAWS AND SECTION<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
LAW \/ SECTION<\/strong><\/strong><\/td> WHAT IT MEANS<\/strong><\/strong><\/td> RELEVANCE IN THIS CASE<\/strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead> SECTION 498A, INDIAN PENAL CODE<\/a>, 1860<\/strong><\/td> Punishes cruelty by a husband or his relatives towards a married woman. Cruelty may include serious mental or physical harm or harassment connected with an unlawful dowry demand.<\/td> This was the main offence alleged against the petitioner. The Court held that an alleged second wife did not fall within the legal meaning of the husband\u2019s \u201crelative\u201d and that only vague allegations were made against her.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 494, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860<\/strong><\/td> Deals with Bigamy i.e., marrying another person during the lifetime of an existing husband or wife when the second marriage is legally void because the first marriage continues.<\/td> The FIR initially referred to alleged bigamy. The Magistrate did not take cognizance of this offence. The High Court also observed that the petitioner could herself be an aggrieved person if the man concealed his existing marriage from her.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 306, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860<\/strong><\/td> Punishes abetment of suicide.<\/strong> The prosecution must establish intentional instigation, aid or a sufficiently direct act connected with the suicide.<\/td> Mentioned while discussing the Supreme Court judgment in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh<\/strong><\/em>.<\/strong> It was not an offence charged against the petitioner in the present case.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 3, DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961<\/strong><\/td> Punishes giving, taking or assisting in the giving or taking of dowry, subject to the statutory requirements and exceptions.<\/td> The petitioner was prosecuted under this provision, but the Court found no specific material showing her participation in any exchange of dowry.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 4, DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT<\/a>, 1961<\/strong><\/td> Punishes a direct or indirect demand for dowry. A specific demand attributable to the accused must ordinarily be shown.<\/td> The Court found no specific evidence connecting the petitioner with an alleged dowry demand.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 482, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Preserves the High Court\u2019s inherent power to prevent abuse of the judicial process, give effect to orders under the CrPC and secure the ends of justice.<\/td> This was the principal provision invoked for quashing the criminal proceedings against Accused No. 6.<\/td><\/tr> SECTIONS 437, 438 AND 439, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Section 437 concerns bail by courts other than the High Court or Court of Session; Section 438 concerns anticipatory bail; Section 439 gives special bail powers to the High Court and Court of Session.<\/td> These provisions appear in the computer-generated cause-title description of the petition. The substantive order was decided as a quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 528, BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA<\/a>, 2023<\/strong><\/td> Preserves the inherent powers of the High Court under the new criminal procedure law, broadly corresponding to Section 482 CrPC.<\/td> It appears in the generated case description and interlocutory application portions of the judgment. The petition itself was instituted in 2022 under Section 482 CrPC.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 156(1), CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Authorises the officer in charge of police station to investigate a cognizable offence without an order from a Magistrate.<\/td> Mentioned within the principles laid down in the Bhajan Lal<\/em> judgment on when criminal proceedings may be quashed.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 155(2), CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Provides that police ordinarily cannot investigate a non-cognizable offence without a Magistrate\u2019s order.<\/td> Mentioned as part of the Bhajan Lal<\/em> categories governing the High Court\u2019s quashing jurisdiction.<\/td><\/tr> SECTION 198(1)(c), CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Regulates who may file a complaint for certain matrimonial offences, including an offence under Section 494 IPC, in specified circumstances.<\/td> Discussed through the Supreme Court decision in A. Subash Babu<\/em>, concerning who may qualify as an aggrieved person in a bigamy prosecution.<\/td><\/tr> ARTICLE 226, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA<\/a><\/strong><\/td> Gives High Courts the power to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights.<\/td> Referred to in the quoted Bhajan Lal<\/strong><\/em> principles<\/strong> along with the High Court\u2019s inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n CASE DETAILS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
PARTICULAR<\/strong><\/strong><\/td> DETAILS<\/strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead> CASE TITLE<\/strong><\/td> M. Annapurna Devi v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another<\/em><\/strong><\/td><\/tr> COURT<\/strong><\/td> High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> JURISDICTION<\/strong><\/td> Special Original Jurisdiction<\/td><\/tr> CASE NUMBER<\/strong><\/td> Criminal Petition No. 8080 of 2022<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> DATE OF DECISION<\/strong><\/td> 9 April 2026<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> BENCH<\/strong><\/td> Hon\u2019ble Sri Justice K. Sreenivasa Reddy<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> PETITIONER<\/strong><\/td> M. Annapurna Devi<\/strong>, arrayed as Accused No. 6<\/td><\/tr> RESPONDENT NO. 1<\/strong><\/td> State of Andhra Pradesh, through Station House Officer, Disha Women Police Station, Tirupati<\/td><\/tr> RESPONDENT NO. 2<\/strong><\/td> Nayanapalli Lakshmi Shobha, de facto complainant<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n COUNSELS APPEARED<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
PARTY<\/strong><\/strong><\/td> COUNSEL<\/strong><\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead> PETITIONER \/ ACCUSED NO. 6<\/strong><\/td> Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, Senior Counsel<\/strong>, appearing for Sri B.V. Anjaneyulu, Counsel for the Petitioner<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> RESPONDENT NO. 1 \/ STATE<\/strong><\/td> Learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> RESPONDENT NO. 2 \/ DE FACTO COMPLAINANT<\/strong><\/td> Sri D. Purna Chandra Reddy<\/strong><\/td><\/tr> CAUSE-TITLE DESCRIPTION FOR RESPONDENTS<\/strong><\/td> Sri D. Purnachandra Reddy and Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n KEY TAKEAWAYS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
\n