NEW DELHI<\/em>: A Delhi court<\/a><\/strong> has discharged a husband<\/strong> from offences under Sections 498A<\/a><\/strong> and 323<\/strong> of the Indian Penal Code<\/a> after finding that the allegations of matrimonial cruelty were vague<\/strong> and the evidence did not create grave suspicion that he had assaulted his wife.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Judicial Magistrate First Class Shruti Sharma-II of Tis Hazari Courts<\/strong>, West District, Delhi, passed the order on July 9, 2026. The chargesheet had been filed in FIR No. 94 of 2025 registered at Tilak Nagar Police Station.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The husband was represented by Advocates Jyoti Sharma and Rishabh Jain of Tripaksha Litigation<\/a><\/strong>. They argued that the complaint was an “afterthought<\/em><\/strong>” filed after the wife withdrew from a settlement for divorce by mutual consent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The couple had married on November 23, 2015. The court record showed that they had an age difference of around 11 years. The defence stated that the wife had been unhappy with the marriage<\/strong> and that both parties eventually accepted that their relationship was no longer workable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2024, the parties entered into a detailed settlement. Under the settlement, the wife agreed to give up her rights in a property and relinquish the custody of their minor child in favour of the husband. Both parties then filed the first motion for divorce by mutual consent before the Family Court<\/strong>, which was recorded on February 3, 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The wife signed affidavits before the Family Court stating that she had understood the settlement and was acting voluntarily, without force, pressure or coercion. Her signatures appeared on every page and were attested by an Oath Commissioner<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, after the first divorce motion, she withdrew from the settlement and later filed the criminal complaint. She claimed that her signatures had been obtained through deceit and that the husband had “unlawfully taken<\/em><\/strong>” the child.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court noticed that the wife did not deny that the signatures on the settlement deed belonged to her. Her main objection was that her consent was not voluntary. However, she had not filed any criminal case alleging forgery, nor had she approached a competent court to cancel the settlement or challenge the Family Court proceedings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court also observed that she was an educated woman with a B.Sc. degree and previous work experience<\/strong>. Despite this, her complaint did not explain why she remained silent before the Oath Commissioner, her own lawyer and the Family Court if her consent had actually been obtained through deceit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The complaint also contained conflicting versions regarding the child\u2019s custody. At one place, the wife admitted that she had agreed to relinquish custody under the settlement. At another place, she alleged that the husband had wrongfully taken the child.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court referred to the connected Domestic Violence Act proceedings titled “Sushma vs. Shubh Chandan”.<\/strong> Those proceedings had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The Protection Officer\u2019s report recorded that the wife was allegedly residing with another man, whom the defence described as her paramour.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court clarified that this material was not conclusive proof of any relationship. However, it was relevant while examining the surrounding circumstances and the defence claim that the criminal case followed the collapse of the divorce settlement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While examining the Section 498A allegation, the court found that the wife had mainly complained about the husband\u2019s alleged impotence, medical conditions, concealed ailments, alcohol consumption <\/strong>and behaviour during the marriage.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The court held that an allegation of impotence or sexual incapacity, even when taken at face value, would not by itself amount to “cruelty<\/em><\/strong>” under Section 498A IPC. Such a condition may provide a ground for seeking matrimonial relief before the Family Court, but it cannot automatically be treated as a criminal offence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The wife had also alleged that the husband concealed his medical condition and impotence until 2022. However, the court noted that the couple had married in 2015 and had a child in 2018. Her complaint did not explain how the allegation remained undiscovered for several years or how it could be reconciled with the birth of the child.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Similarly, the alleged non-disclosure of diabetes or other medical conditions could not, without additional facts, constitute criminal “cruelty<\/em><\/strong>“. The court held that merely suffering from a medical ailment is neither a deliberate act nor conduct intended to subject a spouse to cruelty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The wife further claimed that jewellery worth \u20b97 lakh and \u20b93.5 lakh in cash had been given at the time of marriage. However, she did not specify any demand made by the husband or his relatives before, during or after the marriage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court noted that the complainant herself used the expression “dowry<\/em><\/strong>” for the money and articles allegedly given at marriage. It observed that the giving of dowry is also prohibited under the Dowry Prohibition Act<\/strong> and that such an admission may itself disclose an offence relating to giving dowry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Her allegations concerning late-night drinking and verbal abuse were also found to be general. No dates, specific incidents, exact words or persons present during the alleged incidents were identified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The wife also alleged that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home after she began working in June 2023. However, the complaint did not identify any specific action of the husband that compelled her to leave<\/strong>. The settlement documents, on the other hand, recorded that the parties had separated on January 10, 2024, and that she had moved out on that date.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The court therefore held that the essential ingredients of Section 498A IPC were not established even at the preliminary stage. The husband was discharged from the cruelty charge.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The court then independently examined the alleged assault dated May 2, 2024, which formed the basis of the Section 323 IPC charge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The wife alleged that the husband followed her after she left the house and physically assaulted her. An MLC from DDU Hospital recorded simple injuries and mentioned a history of assault as narrated by her.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the police Daily Diary entry<\/strong> recorded immediately after the incident presented a different picture. When the investigating officer reached the spot, he found two men and one woman abusing each other, while the two men were involved in a physical fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the men was identified as the husband. The other was the man whom the defence described as the wife\u2019s alleged paramour. The police separated both men and initiated preventive proceedings under Sections 107 and 151 CrPC against them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Significantly, the contemporaneous police entry did not state that the husband was assaulting the wife or that she was the direct target of any physical attack. The material instead indicated that a scuffle had occurred between the two men, during which the wife sustained simple injuries.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The court held that the mere presence of injuries in an MLC could not automatically prove that the husband had intentionally caused them. At the stage of framing charges, the material must create grave suspicion that the accused committed the alleged offence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After considering the complaint, MLC, police entry, witness statement and surrounding circumstances, the court found no grave suspicion justifying a trial under Section 323 IPC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The husband was consequently discharged from both charges<\/strong>. The decision protected him from being forced to face a prolonged criminal trial based on broad matrimonial accusations and an assault version that was not supported by the police\u2019s immediate record.<\/p>\n\n\n\nLAWS AND SECTIONS MENTIONED IN THE CASE<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
LAW\/PROVISION<\/strong><\/td> WHAT IT COVERS<\/strong><\/td> HOW IT APPLIED IN THIS CASE<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><\/thead> Section 498A, Indian Penal Code, 1860<\/strong><\/td> Punishes cruelty by a husband or his relatives against a married woman. Cruelty must involve grave wilful conduct or harassment connected with an unlawful demand for property or valuable security.<\/td> The wife alleged impotence, concealed medical conditions, alcohol consumption, verbal abuse, dowry-related acts and removal from the matrimonial home. The court found that the allegations were vague, inconsistent and unsupported by specific incidents. It held that the essential ingredients of Section 498A were not made out.<\/td><\/tr> Section 323, Indian Penal Code, 1860<\/strong><\/td> Punishes voluntarily causing hurt. The prosecution must show that the accused intentionally or knowingly caused bodily pain, disease or infirmity.<\/td> The wife\u2019s MLC recorded simple injuries. However, the contemporaneous police entry showed a fight mainly between the husband and another man. It did not clearly record that the husband intentionally assaulted the wife. The husband was therefore discharged.<\/td><\/tr> Sections 107 and 151, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Section 107 permits preventive action where a person may disturb public peace. Section 151 permits preventive arrest to stop the commission of a cognisable offence.<\/td> After reaching the spot on May 2, 2024, the police separated the husband and the other man and initiated preventive proceedings against both. This supported the defence claim that the incident was a fight between the two men rather than a direct assault by the husband upon the wife.<\/td><\/tr> Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/strong><\/td> Allows the police to examine witnesses during an investigation and record their statements.<\/td> The police recorded the statement of Hardeep Singh regarding the May 2, 2024 incident. His version was considered with the complaint, MLC and Daily Diary entry while assessing whether a charge under Section 323 IPC should be framed.<\/td><\/tr> Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act<\/a>, 2005<\/strong><\/td> Provides civil and protective remedies to women alleging domestic violence, including protection, residence and monetary relief.<\/td> Connected proceedings under the Act were referred to in the order. Those proceedings had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The Protection Officer\u2019s report was considered as part of the surrounding circumstances.<\/td><\/tr> Dowry Prohibition Act<\/a>, 1961<\/strong><\/td> Prohibits demanding, giving and taking dowry.<\/td> The wife stated that cash and jewellery had been given as \u201cdowry.\u201d The court noted that giving dowry is also prohibited and that her own statement could prima facie amount to an admission concerning the giving of dowry.<\/td><\/tr> Divorce by Mutual Consent<\/strong><\/td> Permits spouses to jointly seek dissolution of marriage after mutually agreeing to separate and settling related issues.<\/td> The parties entered into a settlement and filed the first motion for divorce by mutual consent. The wife later withdrew from the settlement and filed criminal proceedings. The court examined this sequence while assessing the credibility and timing of her allegations.<\/td><\/tr> Principles Governing Framing of Charge and Discharge<\/strong><\/td> At the charge stage, the court examines whether the material creates grave suspicion that the accused committed the alleged offence. A trial should not proceed merely on vague or unsupported accusations.<\/td> The court held that neither the cruelty allegations nor the assault material created the required prima facie case or grave suspicion. The husband was discharged from both offences.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n CASE DETAILS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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KEY TAKEAWAYS<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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