Summary
The Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) has dismissed a PIL filed by advocate Anupam Mehrotra, who sought the removal of another advocate, Mr. Sandeep Chandra, from his position as Standing Counsel for the State of U.P. on grounds of conflict of interest due to his wife being a sitting Judge of the same court. The Court found no legal or ethical violation and upheld the advocate’s right to practice, reinforcing boundaries between professional assumptions and factual misconduct.
Brief Facts of the Case
- Petitioner Anupam Mehrotra, a senior advocate, filed a writ petition challenging the appointment of Mr. Sandeep Chandra as State Law Officer at the Lucknow Bench, where his wife serves as a Judge.
- Petitioner alleged that Mr. Chandra’s practice while his wife holds a judicial office amounts to misconduct, citing violation of Rule 6 of the BCI’s Rules.
- The petitioner also alleged improper appointment procedures, breach of legal ethics, and misuse of public funds.
Legal Provisions Involved in the Case
- Rule 6, Chapter II of BCI Rules (Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette) – prohibits advocates from appearing in a Court where a relative is a presiding judge.
- Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 35 – deals with disciplinary proceedings against advocates.
- Article 226 & Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution – fundamental right to practice a profession and High Court’s writ jurisdiction.
- Appendix B of the Legal Remembrancer’s Manual – outlines eligibility and terms for State Law Officers.
- Case Laws: Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Fali S. Nariman, Johri Mal v. State of U.P., Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.
Arguments of Petitioner and Respondent:
Petitioner (In person):
- Asserted Mr. Chandra’s appointment violates Rule 6 due to proximity to his wife, a sitting Judge.
- Claimed unprofessional conduct by displaying nameplates jointly at residence.
- Accused the State of misusing taxpayer money and making an illegal appointment.
- Urged that the role of Standing Counsel constitutes a public office, justifying a quo warranto
Respondents (State of U.P. and High Court):
- Argued Rule 6 applies only to the specific courtroom where a relative presides—not the entire High Court.
- Cited Delhi High Court’s judgment (Mathews J. Nedumpara), interpreting “Court” narrowly.
- Emphasized that Standing Counsel engagement is contractual, not a statutory office; thus, quo warranto does not apply.
- Highlighted absence of any proven misconduct or favoritism.
Court’s Observations:
- Rule 6 Interpretation: Adopted the Delhi HC view – the rule applies only to a specific bench, not the entire High Court.
- No Misconduct Proven: Petitioner failed to cite a single instance of undue benefit or actual professional misconduct by Mr. Chandra or his wife.
- Professional Rights: Recognized the right to practice under Article 19(1)(g) and Section 30 of the Advocates Act.
- Engagement is Contractual: Reiterated that Law Officers are not public servants under law; appointments are executive and terminable at will.
- Scandalous Allegations: The Court rebuked the petitioner for making baseless and offensive remarks about the judicial officer and her spouse, which lacked factual support and decorum.
Conclusion of the Judgment:
The writ petition was dismissed at the admission stage. The Court found:
- No legal bar or professional impropriety in the Standing Counsel’s appointment.
- The appointment did not violate Rule 6 as interpreted in established precedent.
- The petitioner’s claims were speculative, lacked evidentiary support, and were unfit for judicial interference.
- Scathing observations were made against the petitioner for using inappropriate language and making unsubstantiated claims.
Comments from the author of this website
This case exposes a worrying trend where men are targeted on the basis of their marital ties—not their own conduct. Mr. Chandra faced serious allegations only because his wife is a Judge, despite no wrongdoing or advantage being proven.
Such challenges:
- Undermine professional autonomy and merit.
- Impose guilt by association, which is unfair and discriminatory to men.
- Encourage vindictive litigation under the guise of ethics or public interest.
Importantly, the judgment reaffirms that:
- A man should not be penalized simply for being married to a woman in power.
- Allegations must be based on facts, not perceptions or relationships.
This is a positive precedent for fairness, ensuring that male professionals are judged on conduct—not on who they’re married to.
Final Thought:
This judgment serves as a cautionary tale against weaponizing assumptions, especially when they are grounded in marital associations rather than factual misconduct. It is a reminder that integrity in the legal profession must be measured by actions, not affiliations.
Men in the legal field—or any profession—should not be subjected to bias or prejudice simply due to their spouse’s position. Upholding this principle is not only about protecting men’s rights; it’s about preserving the very foundation of justice and fairness in our constitutional democracy.
Read Complete Judgement Here